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Reflections on the Ongoing Effort
to Modernize Financial Services
Regulation
by John D. Hawke, Jr.*
The subject today is financial modernization, and .I will address in
particular the proposal that we in the Treasury Department of the
Clinton administration put forth last year, in 1997, relating to the
modernization of rules governing financial services. especially wish to
share with you the thinking that underlies our legislative proposal. I
will not try to get embroiled in the details, because I think the broad
principles are, in many ways, more interesting.
The first objective was to try to get rid of the rules that serve-and in
fact were intended to serve-to limit competition between different
providers of financial services. Such laws as the Glass-Steagall Act of
1933 and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, especially as amended
in 1970, have served principally to divide markets among politically
influential segments of the financial services industry. To the extent
that those laws prevent affiliation among firms engaged in the securities, insurance, and depository businesses, while limiting providers of
certain of those products from offering a full line of financial products
and services in the format that best meets their business needs, we
think they should be repealed.
At the same time, we think it is essential that the expansion of the
financial activities and affiliations of organizations owning banks not
present additional threats to the safety and soundness of federally
insured institutions. For several reasons, we are confident that our
proposal will not pose such risks.

* Under Secretary for Domestic Finance, United States Department of the Treasury.
This is a transcription of remarks made by Secretary Hawke to law professors at the 1998
Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools held in San Francisco on
January 8, 1998.
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First, the existing regime for bank capital, which requires the
maintenance of high levels of capital, together with prompt corrective
action if capital levels should slide, provides a very strong first line of
defense. Hypothetically, if one could measure the true market value of
bank capital on a real-time basis, one would have very little concern
about what activities banks engage in other than the taking of deposits.
Obvious problems exist with that hypothesis because a person cannot
measure the true value of bank capital on a real-time basis, and bank
capital requirements have to be constructed with that reality in mind.
Nevertheless, if regulators attempted to measure bank capital on a real
market-value basis and move quickly to restore bank capital when it
began to fall below various threshold levels, this oversight would provide
significant protection for the kinds of federal interests that are involved.
Second, we also have a very strong system of fire walls, particularly
those in sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act. Under our
proposal these safeguards would be made even stronger. We would have
provided that in order for a banking organization to take advantage of
new expanded powers to engage in other financial activities, either
through subsidiaries of the bank or through holding company affiliates,
the bank's capital would have to be maintained at the highest level
required by law, the so-called well-capitalized level. Moreover, the bank
would have to be and stay well managed. If the new financial activity
were to be conducted through a subsidiary of the bank, as opposed to a
holding company of the bank, the bank's satisfaction of that wellcapitalized requirement would have to be measured after deducting the
bank's equity investment in the subsidiaries. The bank would have to
be in essence overly well-capitalized before it could invest equity in a
subsidiary to take advantage of expanded financial activity. To put it
in other terms, even if the bank's investment in the subsidiary were
wiped out by a failure of the subsidiary, the bank's ability to satisfy its
capital requirements should not be diminished.
Furthermore, we would also make the 23A and 23B fire walls
applicable to dealings with the subsidiaries; they are not so applicable
now. We thought that would provide an effective subsidiary framework
for expanded financial activity.
I should say that this second main feature of the proposal is not
without its detractors. Our position was that there should be full parity
between holding company affiliates and bank operating subsidiaries in
the scope of permissible financial activities. The Federal Reserve has
strongly argued to the contrary that all new financial activities should
be permitted only in holding companies subsidiaries and not in bank
subsidiaries. Interestingly, the Federal Reserve's position was not based
on safety and soundness concerns, because I think the Fed recognized
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that safety and soundness considerations were probably not affected by
that choice of format. The Fed's argument was based instead on the
notion that banks enjoy a safety-net subsidy that is somehow more easily
spread to subsidiaries than it is to affiliates, and that is a matter of
public policy. According to this logic, the format for new activity should
be limited to the holding company affiliate in order to dampen the
spread of the subsidy.
There is very vigorous debate over whether any subsidy exists,
particularly when the costs of bank regulation are taken into account.
The Fed's argument, furthermore, fails to recognize that whatever
subsidy does exist is no more easily spread downstream to a subsidiary
than upstream to a holding company. We thought, particularly in light
of the capital haircut that we would provide for investments in
subsidiaries, that there was no difference at all in a bank's ability to
transmit whatever subsidy value may inhere in its retained earnings
either by dividends to its parent or by capital contributions to its
subsidiary.
I have consciously emphasized expansion of the financial powers in
affiliations of banking organizations, but that leaves aside the question
of what nonfinancial activities might be open to banks. This is an
important question for at least three reasons.
First, many insurance, securities, and diversified financial services
firms already engage, to some generally quite modest degree, in
nonfinancial activities. American Express, for example, owns a travel
business. Fidelity Investments, for one reason or another, owns a
limousine company. (I always had a picture of them picking up potential
mutual fund investors at Logan Airport and taking them downtown.).
For some reason, Goldman Sachs owns bowling alleys. Some of the big
insurance companies have interests in healthcare companies. If we want
to get these companies in under the tent-that is, to provide a common
set of ground rules for different providers of financial services-we
cannot expect them to abandon completely an important part of their
present franchise.
Another good reason exists to confront the question of the relation
between banking and commerce. Companies that own only a single
federally insured thrift institution have no limits at all on their ability
to engage in nonfinancial activity. And while there are only a relatively
few so-called unitary thrift holding companies that have any appreciable
degree of nonfinancial activity, the absence of holding company activity
restraints on those companies provides a far broader market for thrift
stocks than is true respecting banks. If we want to rationalize
regulation and provide a common set of ground rules for affiliations with
depository institutions, we have to take account of that disparity in some
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reasonable way. That is not to say that we have to take down all the
limits on nonfinancial activities.
The third reason for addressing this issue is that it is increasingly
difficult to define in today's marketplace what is financial and what is
nonfinancial, given the complex information- and technology-driven
economy that we have. Businesses with financial activities should not
be required to live under the threat of divestiture or other penalty for
making a misjudgement about the nature of their activities. Nor should
they be precluded from realizing the benefit of efficiencies that are
possible where financial systems and technology can have nonfinancial
application.
We had a presentation from Dean Witter as we were considering this
legislation that described to us the credit card servicing operation that
they put together in connection with the Discover Card, their highly
successful credit card. They have large numbers of people who operate
their 800 telephone system dealing with complaints and inquiries from
credit card customers. They found that by using those same people and
phones and with only a little more training they could also do catalog
sales for Eddie Bauer and operate Mobil Oil's Auto Club. I thought that
was a particularly compelling example of how technology developed for
a financial purpose could have a very benign application in the
nonfinancial area.
This so-called banking and commerce issue is not really susceptible to
easy, rational discourse. Those who believe that banking and commerce
should be separated often express a deeply held philosophic feeling on
that score, and those who believe that there should be no prohibitions at
all on banking and commerce are hard pressed to answer the question,
"Who really wants this?" There clearly is not an enormous clamor in the
marketplace to eliminate entirely the barriers between banking and
nonfinancial activities. Even when a mixing of banking and commerce
was fully possible-that is, up until 1970-we never saw much interest
in affiliations between banks and purely commercial or industrial firms.
The experience with the unitary thrift holding company bears that out.
While a handful of diversified nonfinancial companies own thrifts, there
are relatively few-no more than ten of those thrifts-that are over a
billion dollars in size. The notion that if we take down these barriers we
are going to open the floodgates to a Keiretsu-type economy is not based
on experience.
But in light of these realities, the Treasury Department, seeing a
linkage between the banking and commerce issue and the disposition of
the thrift charter, proposed a choice for Congress. We thought that if
Congress was willing to allow banks to engage in a relatively modest
basket of nonfinancial activity, together with liberal grandfathering of
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existing unitary thrift holding companies, a framework for unifying the
regulation of banks and thrifts would emerge. That is, if going forward,
a person could permit owners of a unified depository institution to have
some modest amount of nonfinancial activity (and we did not try to
define what that should be), then we could accomplish an elimination of
a separate thrift charter and a merger of thrift charters with banks. On
the other hand, if Congress was unwilling to allow any such leeway with
banking organizations, we believe that Congress should also retain the
thrift charter as it is so that it preserves the existing means that
diversified financial services companies have to own federally insured
depository institutions. Of course, thrifts are virtually indistinguishable
from banks to the general public and even as a legal matter they are
becoming increasingly indistinguishable.
The choices that we posed (and we do not have any ability to dictate
to Congress the choices that they may want to consider) drew the
banking and commerce issue in sharp focus, particularly for those who
adamantly oppose any mixing of banking and commerce. They generally
fear that the consequence of failing to define a specific basket of
acceptable nonfinancial activity-or more to the point, the consequence
of no legislation at all-would be to preserve the enormously flexible
thrift charter and the unlimited range of activities permissible for thrift
holding companies. My assumption is that in the absence of some
basket that, together with grandfathering, would accommodate a
unification of bank and thrift regulation, political support for any standalone proposal to curtail the powers of the unitary thrift holding
company would evaporate.
Indeed, while most observers thought early in the game that the
obstacles to achieving financial modernization would come from the
various components of the insurance industry and from small community
banks, it now appears that opposition from the thrift industry is likely
to create the most formidable obstacle to achieving legislation on the
model that appears to be acceptable to both the House Banking and
Commerce Committees. Such a mutually acceptable model might
involve elimination of a separately regulated thrift industry while
providing some grandfathering for unitary thrifts and some defined
basket of permissible nonfinancial activities for at least some bank
holding companies going forward.
The thrifts believe that the thrift charter has highly desirable
flexibility, and I think that is hard to contest. Despite the thrift debacle
of the 1980s, no history of problems can be attributed to the unitary
holding company format. Moreover, the nationwide branching and
preemption advantages that federal thrifts enjoy are extremely
attractive. They believe that anything less than the full highest common
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denominator approach to financial modernization (that is, an approach
that would unify the bank and thrift charters and regulation in a way
that would preserve all the benefits of the thrift charter) would be a step
backwards. In fact, the thrifts would still be unhappy if Congress was
willing to take a highest common denominator approach, because they
assume that all future regulation of bank holding companies, whatever
the range of their powers, would be given to the Federal Reserve.
Thrifts, as well as the diversified financial services companies that own
or want to own thrifts, do not view the Fed, with its rather cumbersome
application proceedings and holding company capital requirements, as
fondly as they view the Office of Thrift Supervision. They have not
gotten to know my friend and fellow panelist Tom Hoenig as well as I
have.
It has also become increasingly clear that if there is no legislation in
the current Congress, thrifts and the diversified financial services firms
that own or want to acquire thrifts will be the big winners, and banks
will be the losers. Banking organizations will be denied the broad new
authority to expand their financial activity that seems to be taken for
granted in the legislative process so far. Both the House Banking and
Commerce Committees have approved formulations that would
significantly expand the financial powers of banking organizations. If
there is no legislation, banking organizations will have to make due with
the limited ability they have to sell insurance and securities under
present law and with whatever might emanate from the Comptroller of
the Currency's so-called Part Five Initiative. The full potential of Part
Five will not be known for a number of years until the inevitable
litigation is all resolved. In the meantime, the thrift charter will
increasingly be turned to by insurance and securities firms that will
recognize its utility as a point of entry into the business of depository
institutions. The more invested in the thrift charter the diversified
companies become, the more difficult it will be in succeeding Congresses
to achieve the kind of legislation we proposed, because by then interest
will have shifted. Paradoxically, the biggest losers are likely to be those
who have been most hostile to financial modernization legislation-the
independent bankers, the banking hard-liners, and to some extent the
Federal Reserve itself-who will find that the financial services industry
has passed it by in favor of entering the banking industry through the
means of the thrift charter.
Question for Secretary Hawke from Professor David Oedel: Your
remarks invite consideration of the recent Korean experience with
universal banks-that is, banks that are involved with both commerce
and the traditional banking business. At least in the Korean experience,
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such institutions appear to be rather susceptible to serious and quick
problems. Could that be a concern in the United States if there were to
be some kind of a marriage of commerce and banking?
Response from Secretary Hawke: I think you have to recognize that
the culture and history in Korea and Japan is quite different in
structure from what we have here. In Japan, for example, the lead
banks in the Keiretsu or diversified organizations have an accepted
obligation that the government puts moral suasion behind to support
their related company. We have never had anything like that. We have
never had any movement toward a real mixing of commercial and
industrial interest with banking interest. Up until 1970, when the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956 was amended, anybody could own one
bank, or before 1956, any number of banks. Yet we never saw any
movement at all toward a mixing of nonfinancial and banking interests.
What we saw, and what caused more legislative action than anything
else, was financial conglomeration. It was the other financial activities
of insurance companies that fell under the same umbrella as banks that
really motivated restrictive legislation. Much of that legislation was
spurred by competitors that did not want to see banks get into their
business rather than philosophical reasons or safety and soundness.
Certainly one cannot deny that if you take down all of the barriers, the
Korean or Japanese models could theoretically exist, but I think that is
really nothing more than theory given the history of our structure.
Question for Secretary Hawke from ProfessorDavid Oedel: I have a
second question related to the reasons behind the failure over many
years to enact financial services modernization legislation. Why has
that been? Is it a political stalemate problem? Is it that industry
groups have veto power? Is it a lack of consumer interest? What are the
prospects in the future?
Response from Secretary Hawke: Ever since the Glass-Steagall Act of
1933 we have had a set of laws that divided markets. If you are the
beneficiary of market division, it is generally something you want to
preserve. What has happened in more recent times is that regulators-banking regulators in particular-have enabled banks to escape
some of the rigors of that market division. The Fed, through its rulings
under Section 20 of Glass-Steagall, has allowed banking organizations
to get into a fairly significant amount of securities activity. The
Comptroller of the Currency has found ways to expand the insurance
activities of banks. And insurance and securities firms now see that is
something of a one way street. One of the reasons they are changing is
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that securities firms now see that it is in their interest to rationalize
these rules so that they have equal opportunity to get into the banking
business.
And that brings me to the second reason to be optimistic about the
prospects for legal reform: what is happening in the marketplace.
Consumers of financial services are no longer drawing distinctions
between various types of investment products. They do not see huge
differences between variable annuities, mutual funds, certificates of
deposits, and other kinds of financial products. These are all different
points on the spectrum of financial products, and they do not want to
have to go to a whole variety of different financial services to get what
they need. I think this is becoming increasingly true as people have
more and more control over their own retirement investments, for
example. In short, legal reform is possible today because the market is
helping to drive this and competitive realities are changing attitudes.
Question for Secretary Hawke from ProfessorDavid Oedel: So you are
not pessimistic. Do you think there is a chance for legislation this year?
Response from Secretary Hawke: The irony is that the banks are the
biggest laggards in the legislative process. It is really being driven by
the securities and insurance firms who want to find a way to get into the
banking business or at least have equivalent opportunities. And the
paradox in my view is that if there is no legislation, the banks are going
to end up being the big losers because there is going to be a big switch
to the thrift charter and the securities and insurance firms are going to
exploit the thrift charter as a way of getting into the business of
depository institutions. The landscape will have changed so much by the
next Congress that banks will be struggling along with these regulatory
exceptions that they have now, but they will not be the beneficiary of a
broad expansion of their ability to engage in financial activity.
Question for Secretary Hawke from Professor David Oedel: Are you
suggesting that we may be on the brink of creating a new banking crisis,
but this time with the banks rather than the thrifts?
Response from Secretary Hawke: Not at all. No, I do not see any
banking crisis at all. The banking and thrift industries both are in the
strongest condition they have ever been in. What I am saying is that
from a competitive point of view there is a certain smugness in the
banking industry, as if the banks were saying, "Why do we need
legislation after all? We can do some securities activities, we can sell
some insurance." I think that is very short sighted, because the
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insurance and securities firms can get into the depository institutions
business by acquiring thrifts.
The federal thrift charter is fabulous. It can branch any place in the
country. It has better preemption rights with respect to state laws and
even national banks for reasons that are attributable to court decisions.
And for anybody doing a nationwide retail consumer finance type
business, a federally chartered thrift is ideal. A big movement will
emerge, and we are already beginning to see it, toward ownership of
thrifts. The public cannot tell the difference between a thrift and a
bank. Legally their powers are almost indistinguishable; in the absence
of rational legislation, the thrift charter will become the charter of
choice. Banks will be left struggling with what they have.
Question for Secretary Hawke from ProfessorHeidi Schooner: To what
extent was your proposal based on functional regulation? What would
the likely effect on functional regulation be if distinctions between
functions were increasingly blurred?
Response from SecretaryHawke: That's a good question. We do have
separate regulation of depository institutions and securities firms at the
federal level, and we have got state regulation of insurance. While the
lines may be blurring, we have not proposed to change radically that
system of regulation. We have taken the view that comparable activity
ought to be comparably regulated, and that if banks engage in securities
activities or insurance activities those activities ought to be regulated in
the same way as their competitors in the insurance and securities fields.
The difficulty comes in dealing essentially with historic anomalies.
Banks have been able to engage in certain securities activities within the
bank, and the real question is how vigorous do we want to be in forcing
a change in existing patterns of activity? Is that necessary to achieve
true functional regulation? That is one of the points of conflict in the
process. With insurance, it is not so much a question of regulation, it is
a question of how you define the activity. It is very difficult, in some
cases, to distinguish certain banking products from insurance. The
insurance interests are concerned that banks are able to do what is
essentially insurance underwriting in the bank in the name of some kind
of deposit taking and that they will have a significant competitive
advantage. I think our proposal, which would allow banks to engage in
expanded insurance and securities activities through wholly owned
subsidiaries, is really an answer to that, because it takes away a lot of
the incentive to fight about whether an activity is insurance or not. If
you can do it in a subsidiary, it is probably going to be cheaper and more
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efficient to do it there than to argue about whether or not it is insurance.
But those are the points of conflict.

